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THE 



MEXICAN SITUATION 



FROM A 



MEXICAN POINT 
OF VIEW 



LUIS CABRERA 



WASHINGTON. D. C, 1913 



THE 



MEXICAN SITUATION 



FROM A 



MEXICAN POINT 
OF VIEW 



LUIS CABRERA 




THE MEXICAN SITUATION FROM A MEXICAN 
POINT OF VIEW 



MUCH has been said in the United States about the Mexican 
situation, but actual conditions in Mexico have never been 
fully understood, because they have always been examined 
from an American point of view. 

The sources from which Americans draw their information about 
Mexico are chiefly foreign residents and investors, who are very 
apt to consider the Mexican situation only from the standpoint ol 
their own interests. All that foreigners seek in Mexico is the 
re-establishment of a state of things favoring the continuation and 
promotion of business. They generally believe that the conditions 
of Mexicans themselves and those issues of a purely national char- 
acter do not concern them, and consequently they do not regard 
them as necessary factors in the problem as they understand it. 
Hence it is that the solutions suggested, although beneficial per- 
haps to foreign interests, do not tend to solve the Mexican problem 
itself. 

To fully understand the Mexican situation and to find a solution 
satisfactory both to Mexican and foreign interests it is necessary to 
review the question from a Mexican point of view. 

Such is the purpose of this memorandum. 

THE RULE OF THE IRON HAND 

The majority of foreigners in Mexico believe that the only politi- 
cal problem which interests them is peace. But, misled by super- 
ficial judgment or inspired by impatience, they have believed that 
the establishment of peace depends only on the energy with which 
the country is governed. All foreigners in Mexico look for a 
rigorous government, an iron hand or a mailed fist, and the only 
thing they discuss is whether a certain man is sufficiently "strong" 
to control the country. And when they find a man with such 
qualities, foreigners always have believed that it was their duty 
to help that man to come into power and to support him. 

By tiranefev 




These were the reasons for foreign sympathy in favor of General 
Reyes first, General Felix Diaz afterward, and then General Huerta ; 
and these are the reasons why President Madero did not get full 
support of the foreign element. He was considered a weak man, 
and consequently unable to maintain peace. 

It is necessary to rectify foreign opinion relative to strong 
Government in Mexico. 

A strong Government is not one able to maintain peace by the 
mere force of arms, but the one that can obtain the support of the 
majority of the citizens of the country. Any peace obtained by the 
iron-hand method is only a temporary peace. Permanent peace 
in Mexico must be based on certain economical, political and 
social conditions which would automatically result in a stable 
equilibrium between the higher and the lower classes of the nation. 

Foreigners should be persuaded that to possess real guarantees 
for their interests it is an essential that such interests be based on 
the welfare of the people of Mexico. 

It is, then, to the interest of foreign capitalists to help Mexicans 
to obtain such conditions as would produce permanent peace. 



A REAL REVOLUTION 

The troubles in Mexico within the last three years are attributable 
to maladministration covering a period of thirty years. The 
internal upheaval could not have reached the present state had mere 
personal ambition been the motive. The revolution in Mexico could 
not be as strong as it is to-day were robbery the only purpose of 
the^oldiers, or were personal ambition the sole incentive of the 
leaders. 

The truth is that the Mexican disturbances constitute a real 
revolution, of apparently political aspect, but at the very bottom are 
of economic and social character. The present revolution is only the 
continuation of the revolution begun in 1910. 

The present revolution's main purpose is to free the lower classes 
from the condition of near-slavery in which they have been held 
and to seek an improvement in their economic and social conditions. 

In Mexico the middle class is in a formative stage. One of the 
results of the present revolution will be to help create such a 
class, thus preserving a social equilibrium in the country. Where 
there is no social equilibrium, there is no lasting peace ; and there 
is no democratic form of Government without a middle class. 

The Mexican situation has three principal aspects — social, eco- 
nomical, and political. 



4 

SOCIAL ASPECT 

]\Jexico has a population of 15,000,000 souls, 15 per cent of 
which are Indians, 75 per cent mixed, or mestizos, and 10 per 
cent of the white race. Mexico, however, has no real race question 
to solve. Indians and Mestizos mix easily with people of European 
nationality. The really important question arises from the dif- 
ferent races forming' the population of Mexico, since we have the 
different stages of civilization of the different types of people. It 
is hard to find a Government formula to rule people of fifteenth, 
eighteenth and twentieth century stages of civilization. The auto- 
cratic dictatorship which might suit the Indian population is entirely 
unfitted for European residents, and the democratic rule acceptable 
by foreign residents or by highly educated Mexicans would never 
suit the large percentage of the illiterate classes. 

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN kEVOLUTION 

The ^Mexican problems have been and still are chieflv economic. 
The colonial policies of Spain in Mexico contributed in' a large 
measure to create privileged classes. Large tracts of land were 
granted to settlers or conquerors and to the Church, and thousands 
of Indians were compelled to live upon the tracts of the land so 
granted. The Indian was kept practicallyl in a state of slavery. 
The independence in 1810 did not materially change the condition 
of the masses. After the religious struggles in i860, the Church 
lost its property, but great land areas owned by wealthy families 
still remained as mainmort, and are at present responsible for 
Mexico's crisis. 

The communal lands formerly owned b\- the towns, and which 
were called cgidos, were, since about i860, divided and apportioned 
among the inhabitants for the purpose of creating small agricul- 
tural properties, but through ignorance those lands were almost 
immediately resold to the large land owners whose properties were 
adjacent. This resulted in strengthening" the oppressive monopoly 
exercised by the large land owners, as the small properties were 
unable to withstand the competition. 

PVom 1880 conditions in Mexico began to be complicated, by 
reason of the policies of General Porfirio Diaz for the development 
of the country. General Diaz thought tliat the best way to develop 
the resources of Mexico was to favor the establishment of large 
business enterprises and the formation of large corporations, to 
•vhich special advantages were offered. He granted large conces- 
sions in lands, mines, railroads, industrial and banking institutions. 



to foreign investors, thus creating enormous monopolies and making- 
more accentuated the contrast between the rich and the labobring 
classes of the nation. The cost of living was raised by the increase 
of capital. The wages of miners, railroad men and those of the 
industrial classes were somewhat increased, although not in pro- 
portion to the increased high cost of living. The wages of the 
rural laborer did not enjo}' this increase, the income of the peon 
still remaining at a ridiculously low average. Notwithstanding the 
low rate of agricultural wages, the great land owners were still 
able to obtain labor, thanks to their political influence, which 
allowed them to keep the peons in practical slavery. 

Farming on a small scale has not been developed in Mexico on 
account of unfavorable conditions for the small land holders. The 
large estates, called haciendas, pay only about lo per cent of the 
taxes levied by law, as a result of misrepresenting the value of the 
property, while the small land holder is obliged to pay the whole 
tax imposed, as he is unable to successfully misrepresent the value 
of his minor holdings, and as he lacks the political influence to 
obtain a reduction. 

The unrest produced by these economic conditions, although not 
clearly understood, was largely responsible for the demand for a 
change, which was so apparent at the close of General Dia:'s 
administration. This economic aspect of the Mexican situation was 
complicated by political problems which at that time began to be 
raised. 

POLITICAL ASPECT 

The ]ylexican Constitution was largely patt-erned after the French 
and the American constitutions. Since the time of its promulga- 
tion, in 1857, fii'st on account of the reform war, then because oi 
the French intervention, and lately owing to the personal dictator- 
ship of General Diaz, the people of Mexico have not had an oppor- 
tunity to test their Constitution. It never was put into effect. 
Study and recent developments, however, have proved that in 
certain particulars the Constitution of Mexico is not fitted to the 
needs of the people. 

TITE CONSTITUTIONALIST TENDENCIES 

Any party wishing to establish peace in Mexico must take in 

consideration these three aspects of the Mexican situation. The 

Constitutionalist party wishes to solve the social problem of Mexico 

by fostering education, so as to level the barriers between the 

upper and lower classes as soon as possible. The Constitutionalist 

party wishes to improve the conditions of the lower classes, so as 



to begin the creation of a middle class. In political matters the 
Constitutionalist party wishes the Government of Mexico to abide 
by the Constitution, but at the same time advocates its reformation 
so as to meet the needs of the country. 

EARLY SYMPTOMS 

Since 1895 there has been a feeling of unrest in Mexico, which 
made itself more apparent during the last years of Generah Diaz's 
government. This feeling of restlessness was not well defined, and 
even when it led to several armed movements after 1905 it was 
generally thought that they were only insurrections of a local char- 
acter or mere riots. When in 1908 General Diaz announced in the 
famous Creelman interview, that he was ready to retire, public 
opinion in Mexico was profoundly stirred. Two opposite tendencies 
appeared — one instigated by the friends of General Diaz, which 
demanded his re-election or the election of a man who would con- 
tinue his policies, and the other which wished a change in the 
Government and in the system. 

It was at that time when Don Francisco I. Madero organized the 
anti-re-election party and when hei began his electoral campaign 
under the motto, "Effective suffrage and no re-election." It was 
supposed that the best remedy for the Mexican situation would be 
a free election of a President and the enactment of a law limiting 
his tenure to one term. The political problem seemed to be the 
most important of all questions, and it absorbed entirely the public's 
attention, so that the economic and social problems were lost sight of. 

General Diaz accepted very easily his last re-election, and per- 
mitted to be named with him as Vice President Ramon Corral, who 
represented the perpetuation of the old regime. No other candidates 
than Diaz and Corral were admitted. Madero was arrested before 
the elections, and the triumph of the Diaz-Corral ticket made 
apparent the impossibility of obtaining a political change b}^ ballot. 

MADERO'S REVOLUTION 

On his escape from prison, Francisco I. Madero started the 
revolution. The Plan of San Luis Potosi, which was the basis of 
the movement, made it clear that the leaders still considered as the 
chief problem of Mexico a political chang'e, and the purpose of 
that plan, was chiefly a change of government. 

The rural classes, however, followed Madero and supported him 
in the revolution initiated by him under the tacit belief that his 
revolution would bring agrarian reforms which were needed to 
improve the condition of the masses, but which were not yet 
enunciated in any concrete form. 



7 

General Diaz believed that he would stop the revolution by his 
retiring from power. The negotiations at Juarez, by which General 
Diaz agreed to retire and to deliver the government to a provi- 
sional President — the person selected by virtue of that agreement 
was Francisco L. de la Barra — checked the revolution precisely 
when it began to acquire its actual strength and real form. 

DE LA BARRA 

De la Barra — a vacillating and Jesuitic character — had no forma- 
tive policy during his administration. As a creature of General 
Diaz, intimately connected with the conservative element of the old 
regime, he merely limited himself to muster out the revolutionary 
army, as the way in which he understood peace ought to be re- 
established. 

By this negative action he minimized the effect of the revolution 
and he prepared a reaction in favor of the old regime. The same 
men who surrounded General Diaz and who had urged the con- 
tinuation of his policies returned to the country when they saw 
that they were not to be persecuted, and started a political cam- 
paign against Madero and against the policies of the revolution. 
It was during this period that efforts were" made to concentrate 
public opinion in favor of General Reyes and De la Barra himself 
as Presidential candidates against Madero. 

It was at this same time that the clerical party, which since 1867 
had shown no signs of life, was' revived under the name of the 
Catholic party, and clearly showed that it favored the reactionary 
principles of the Diaz regime. 

De la Barra's interim administration can be summed up by say- 
ing that while he received the government in trust, to be turned 
over to the Revolution, he did everything in his power to keep it 
for himself and to avoid the advent of the new regime, thus show- 
ing disloyalty both to Madero personally and to the revolution 
itself. 

CAUSES OF MADERO'S FAILURE 

When Madero came into power, in November, 191 1, he found 
the government in such condition that he was unable to change its 
direction, and was forced to accept existing conditions and even 
the same Cabinet appointed by De; la Barra, in which the most 
influenti."^! part was played by Ministers Calero, Hernandez and 
Ernesto Madero. 



8 

Surrounded by nearly all the Diaz people, Madero could not 
establish a reform policy. During all the time of his government 
he was constantly called by two opposite tendencies — on one side 
the reactionary in favor of the Diaz regime, and on the other side 
the revolutionary. 

Madero tried to make friends out of the Diaz partisans, but 
unsuccessfully. At the same time he lost the support of the greater 
part of the men who had helped him during the revolution. 

At the very beginning of Madero's administration a protesting 
movement started, which was backed by some of the old regime. 
The insurrections of Pascual Orozco and of General Bernardo Reyes 
were not more than attempts of reaction against the 1910 revolu- 
tion. The insurrection of Felix Diaz, in the month of September, 

191 2, demonstrated that the reactionary sentiment had acquired a 
great importance, and that the army, which was the same army left 
b}^ General Porfirio Diaz, was not in sympathy with the revolution 
nor with Madero personally. 

A REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 

The insurrection of La Ciudadela in Mexico City, in February, 

191 3, gave the opportunity to General Huerta of becoming" the 
chief of the reactionary movement against the government of 
Madero. 

General Victoriano Huerta, who had been one of the military 
chiefs of Diaz, had lent important services to President Madero by 
suppressing the revolution started by Orozco at Chihuahua. The 
prestige acquired by General Huerta after his triumph against 
Orozco began to be used by the enemies of Madero, who suc- 
ceeded in convincing General Huerta of his personal strength and 
of his being the only support that Madero had. 

During the tragic ten days in Mexico, General Huerta did not 
really attempt to overcome Felix Diaz. He understood that the 
fate of the government was in his hands, and he stood in a supine 
attitude until the last moment, when the pressure of foreigners and 
diplomats in Mexico City gave him an excuse to execute his coup 
d'etat. 

The assassination of Madero and Pino Suarez was considered a 
practical way of removing obstacles to the political success of the 
new government. Huerta believed by the removal of the President 
and Vice President he was practically without enemies, and that 
some time must pass before the revolutionary elements could con- 
centrate on a new leader. In this he was mistaken. 



RESUMPTION OF THE STRUGGLE 

During" Aladero's. government the position of the revohitionary 
element was uncertain and awkward, because, while they were 
supposed to be exercising a great political influence through 
Madero, practically they had no influence whatever, since the 
JMadero -government was almost controlled by the conservative 
Cabinet. 

After the death of President Madero the position of the revolu- 
tionary elements became clear. During his life, for reasons of 
loyalty and hope of a change, they had never taken an aggressive 
attitude against him, but once the President was dead and nothing 
to be hoped for from Pluerta, there was no difficulty in renewing 
the struggle. 

Pluerta represented the reaction, and his government was no 
more than the restoration of the government of General Diaz, with 
its same proceedings and the same men under the orders of another 
chief. The revolution against, Huerta is no more than the same 
revolution started in 1910 by Madero, and which, having been 
checked in 191 1 by virtue of the negotiations of Juarez and the 
election of Madero, now continued and entered into full activity, 
augmented because of the revolting circumstances under which the 
fall of Madero had taken place. The death of Madero has been 
one of the most powerful sentimental factors to increase the revo- 
lutionary movement against Huerta. 

AIMS OF THE REVOLUTION 

It has been very widely stated that the Carranza movement has 
only the purpose of aveng-ing the death of Madero and reinstating 
the office holders appointed by him. This is not the case. The 
purposes of the Constitutionalists are higher and better defined 
than were the motives of the 1910 movement. The Constitutional- 
ists propose the re-establishment of a Constitutional government 
in Mexico, but as they realize the unfitness of the INIexican Con- 
stitution and other laws, they intend to reform them in order to 
have a system fitted to the country. 

There is no doubt that peace in Mexico cannot be established 
unless a complete change takes place in the Government's personnel 
and in the systems and laws. This is the reason that the Constitu- 
tionalists appear too radical to those who would like to find a wa}- 
of pacifying Mexico at once. 

The Constitutionalists mean to begin immediately such economic 
reforms, and especially such agrarian reforms as are necessary to 



lO 

offer to the lower classes an opportunity of improving their condi- 
tion; division of large estates; equalization of taxation, and, in 
places where it would be necessary, the re-establishment of the 
egidos or communal land system. 

THE LEADERS 

Doubts have been raised as to the ability of the men leading the 
Revolution to carry out those reforms and to reorganize the Gov- 
ernment and pacify the country. Such doubts refer even to the 
supposed inability of the leaders to overthrow Huerta and to main- 
tain control of the Revolutionary groups. Carranza and the men 
who are helping him have always been described as mere bandits 
in Mexican and foreign papers. 

This is very far from the truth. 

A glance at Carranza and the men around him,, and comparing 
them with General Huerta and his associates, makes it clear that 
there is a vast difference between the two, the result being in favor 
of Carranza and against Huerta. 

Huerta is well known at present. His moral standard, his educa- 
tion, and his ability as a statesman are nil. His success and his 
political strength came from the support that he received from the 
conservative elements. At the beginning of his government — with 
the Cabinet imposed to him by the men of "La Ciudadela" — it 
seemed that he tried to surround himself with intelligent and honest 
people ; but lately his Cabinet has been formed of most undesirable 
men, like Moheno, Blanquet and Lozano. 

At the beginning of the Constitutionalist movement Carranza 
found it difficult to obtain the co-operation of well-known men. 
But time brought changes. At present his Cabinet is formed by 
Licenciado Francisco Escudero, a prominent lawyer of the State of 
Jalisco, formerly Speaker in the House of Representatives, and a 
man of great culture ; Licenciado Rafael Zubaran, a very mtelligent, 
straightforward and able lawyer of the State of Campeche ; Ing. 
Ignacio Bonillas, a graduate of the Massachusetts School of Tech- 
nology, of Boston, and General Felipe Angeles, a technical militarv 
man, formerly Director of the Military School in Chapultepec. The 
high standing and the ability of these gentlemen is far above the 
moral standard and ability of Huerta and his men. 

The people fighting under the orders of Carranza, like the above- 
named gentlemen, have been made the object of the most malicious 
and unjust attacks in the Mexican and even in many American 
papers, thus creating for them such a reputation that one not well 
informed would hardly dare to defend them. 



II 



It is eminently proper to say that among the mihtary leaders 
of the Revolution there are several persons whose uprightness, 
morals and intelligence are beyond discussion. 

General Pablo Gonzalez and General Antonio I. Villarreal, in 
the State of Tamaulipas; General Jesus Carranza and General 
Lucio Blanco, in Nuevo Leon ; General Maytorena and ex-Governor 
Pesquei'ra, in Sonora ; General Alvaro Obregon, in Sinaloa ; General 
Rodriguez Cabo and General Aguilar, in San Luis Potosi, are among 
them, whose conduct during the revolution has been uniformly 
proper and just within the rules of war. 

OTHER LEADERS 

Outside of these leaders, there are several other men whom 
the reading pubhc has been taught to consider as bandits, 
absolutely devoid of any moral sense, and whose alleged 
atrocities are always charged to the account of Carranza. Most 
of the charges brought against them are false; but, without enter- 
ing into details, there is a single consideration with which they 
can be defended, namely : 

No revolution in any country or in history has been made by a 
man choosing in anticipation the tools that he will employ to over- 
throw a regime. 

Revolutions start spontaneously, and in a more or less anarchic 
way, and the task of the leaders as the movement progresses is 
largely one of selecting the good and eliminating the bad and 
leading the movement in the right channel. 

In this matter Carranza has proved with facts that whatever may 
have been the nature of the elements found by him at the beginning 
of the revolution, the character of these elements has been improved 
by him daily. One can see that there is a large difference in the 
proceedings of war employed at the beginning and the proceedings 
at the present time, as the leaders have acquired more control over 
the soldiers. As bad as the atrocities may have been at the begin- 
ning, the greater is the merit of Carranza and the Revolutionary 
leaders, as they have proved it was possible to continue the revolu- 
tion with the same elements by improving the discipline of their 
forces and by creating a sense of responsibility in the small leaders, 
thus bringing order out of chaos. 

On the other side, the military methods used by Huerta and the 
politicians around him, by his advisers and by the military chiefs 
in command of his army, are not sufficiently known outside of 
Mexico. Everybody would be surprised to know that Huerta's 
methods in fighting the rebels are bloodier and more brutal than 
those of the Revolutionists. 



12 

The acceptance b\- Carranza of Zapata's aid was considered as 
the most imprudent act of Carranza. This acceptance shows, how- 
ever, his cleverness as Chief of the Revolution. 

What is called "zapatismo," the agrarian revolution in the 
southern part of Mexico, exists — and ought to exist — whoever the 
chief of that revolution may be. 

The "zapatismo" is not the result of the will of Zapata, but a 
special condition of the region and a peculiar aspect of the revolu- 
tion in that part of the country, the result of a special economic 
situation, made more critical by the form of repression employed 
by the Federal troops. 

Carranza was not free to choose between Zapata and some other 
leader, nor between the Zapatistas and some other army. He 
was bound to accept, and he did well to accept, the "zapatismo" 
as the only practical way of obtaining control of the Southern 
revolution, which has been considered as most chaotic. 

/ 

THE POLICY OF .NON-RECOGNITION 

President Wilson's policy of non-recognition of the Huerta 
administration, based on both the illegality and immorality of its 
origin, is well justified. In refusing to support a government which 
tries to continue a system of personal government founded on 
privileges, monopolies and the predominance of great interests over 
the lower classes, he has done right. 

The results obtained by that policy of non-recognition have been 
undoubtedly very important, in that they prevented the consolida- 
tion of Huerta's rule. Had the United States recognized Huerta, 
he would have acquired certain temporal strength ; and while the 
revolution would not have been checked on that account, the 
sacrifice of life and property would have been much more con- 
siderable and the struggle would have been more protracted. 

The natural impatience of European as well as certain American 
interests to see peace re-established in Mexico so that they may 
renew their business activities, has led the Washington administra- 
tion to believe that it would be wise not only to assume a passive 
attitude toward Huerta, but to take some active steps for the 
purpose of eliminating him. Those active steps, which might 
properl_v be called a species of pacific intervention, might result, 
to be sure, in the elimination of Huerta, himself, and his cabinet, 
but all the other problems which the revolution proposes to solve 
would be left pending. 

THE POLICY OF "ELIMINATION 

Those active steps of the American Government to eliminate 
Huerta, which the x\merican press has been advocating in moments 



13 

when public opinion has been greatly aroused, has brought about 
results contrary to those which might have been expected, afford- 
ing Huerta a chance to strengthen himself and to appear as the 
champion of Mexico's sovereignty. 

Huerta, whose behavior at the time of the murder of Madero 
led him to consult and discuss his coup d'etat with America's 
Ambassador, is now, however, the ostensible defender of Mexico's 
sovereignty against the interference of the American Government. 
This attitude, while not giving him any new friends, has at least 
served to appease many of his enemies. 

On the other hand, the good disposition of the American Govern- 
ment toward the Constitutionalists, or, at least, the expression of 
its sympathy with their ideals, has helped the Constitutionalist 
cause, strengthening it considerably in the public mind ; but . the 
active steps taken to bring about an understanding between the 
Constitutionalists and Washington, through Dr. Hale, as repre- 
sented by the press, have tended to produce, in respect to Carranza, 
an effect totally opposite to that which Lind's mission produced 
with regard to Huerta ; that is, the steps taken might have con- 
siderably lessened Carranza's prestige before the Mexican public 
had it not been for the straightforwardness shown by the Constitu- 
tionalist leader in making a frank statement that he did n6t desire 
any actual assistance from the United States or from any other 
foreign country in accomplishing the overthrow of Huerta. The 
impatience felt in public opinion and the desire on the part of 
President Wilson to carry out to an end his avowed purpose of 
eliminating Huerta, have led to the idea that an immediate solution 
of the Mexican crisis must be had. 

. In fact, there is a great desire to bring the war to an end as 
quickly as possible and to eliminate Huerta at the earliest moment. 
For that purpose various schemes have been suggested which, 
precisely on account of their tendency to bring about quick results, 
are endangering the success of the revolution. Quick results of 
this character would signify only a fictitious and temporary peace. 

COMPROMISING 

All attempts to convince Huerta and Carranza that they should 
abandon their pretences and agree upon a neutral candidate who 
would call new elections are very dangerous. 

In the present struggle in Mexico we find on one side the monied 
elements, deeply conservative and reactionary and interested in 
the continuation of a regime that has the hatred of the masses ; 
and, on the other hand, we find the revolutionary elements deeply 



14 

interested in the complete transformation of the country. Under 
these circumstances, no possible compromise can take place. 

We know, through actual experience in Mexico, that the results 
of compromise between the progressive and conservative parties 
have always been disastrous. The administrations of Iturbide, 
Comonfort and De la Barra are the three most conspicuous instances 
of it. On each occasion a new revolution started with greater vigor 
than before. 

THE NEUTRAL MEN 

A neutral man, equally acceptable to both sides — if such a man 
could be found in Mexico — would have to be either openly con- 
servative or liberal. In the first case, the compromise would 
amount to placing the government of Mexico in the hands of the 
Conservative party ; but the leadership of a man who, by reason 
of his honorable character, or his moral standing, or his good 
faith in promoting the conservative cause, would make the realiza- 
tion of the reforms desired by the Constitutionalist party even much 
more difficult. In the second case — that is, if such a man belonged 
to the Liberal party, it can be said in advance that he would not 
be a man of strong personality and he would not have the firmness 
of character and intelligence so necessary to rule Mexico at the 
present time. At the stage which the Mexican revolution now has 
reached, the onl_v neutral men who remain in the country are, in 
fact, those who, through fear, lack of patriotism, or indifference to 
political questions, have kept aloof. All other men of some sig- 
nificance who have not mixed in politics — and among which a man, 
perhaps, could be selected for that purpose — are men of great 
financial resources and who are intimately connected with the 
conservative elements which now rule the country. 

AN IMMEDIATE ELECTION 

A compromise between General Huerta and the Constitutionalists, 
by virtue of which Huerta would retire and Carranza would come in 
power, would also be very dangerous if it were immediately followed 
by presidential elections. Mexico has not had a chance yet 
to sufficiently study the present electoral laws. If the revolutionary 
government, once in power, attempted to immediately hold new 
elections, great difficulties would at once be encountered, not only 
on account of the present state of war, but on account of the lack 
of proper electoral laws to carry into effect a free and fair election. 



15 

If the revolution were checked at the present time, and immediate 
elections called, the conservative element would have a new oppor- 
tunity to win in a farcical election by making use of the same 
means that up to the present time they have so successfully used in 
the past. 

,THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MADERO CABINET 

There has been lately much talk about solving the political conflict 
in Mexico by bringing things to the same state in which they were 
upon the death of Madero — that is, by handing over the situation to 
Mr. Lascurain, or to some other member of that cabinet, and 
annulling all the acts of Huerta's administration from that time. 
This form of solving the problem would be impracticable. Further- 
more, it would not be a god policy because it would amount to a 
mere restoration and a mere reactionary movement to put things 
in the state in which they were before. And the worst of all is that 
this restoration would place the government precisely in the hands 
of those who were the chief factors to bring about the apparent 
unpopularity of President Madero among the revolutionary ele- 
ments, and the same ones who forced him to practically place him- 
self in the hands of the Conservative party. 

Mr. Lascurain is an honorable man, but he lacks personality. 
This he showed when he delivered the resignations of the President 
and the Vice President before the latter had been placed in safety. 
Furthermore, he is a man of considerable means and he is intimately 
connected with the Catholic party. 

On the other hand, Mr. Rafael Hernandez, who was Minister of 
the Interior at the time of Madero's fall, is the member of the 
cabinet who was most intimately connected with the financial ele- 
ments surrounding General Diaz during the last years of his 
administration and was the member of the cabinet who most 
strongly opposed the idea that President Madero should follow a 
policy of reform. 

LAISSER FAIRE 

The lack of definite ideas relative to the present situation in 
Mexico as well as in the United States and other foreign countries 
and the difficulty of fixing upon a practical way of solving the 
problem are due to the fact that a very quick solution has been 
looked for. 

Any attempt to solve that problem by hasty means, seeking an 
immediate change of government and the immediate establishment 
of peace, is apt to give merely temporal and fictitious results. 



i6. 

The first thing to do is to impress the public mind with the 
idea that the present revolution in Mexico is really a social, political 
and economic revolution, and, as such, requires for its accomplish- 
ment a certain lapse of time and, perhaps, further sacrifices of- 
life which, while painful to contemplate, are nevertheless necessary. 

A social revolution has the same characteristics that certain 
cychc diseases have among men. It is necessary and inevitable to 
wait for their full development, and any attempt to prematurely 
interrupt or check them will bring about very dangerous compli- 
cations. 



Washington, D. C, December ist, 1913. 











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LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 



PUBLISHED BY 

CONFIDENTIAL AGENCY 
OF THE 

CONSTITUTIONALIST GOVERNMENT 
OF MEXICO 

WASHINGTON. D. C. 



The NORRIS-PETERS CO., WaBhington, D. C. 



